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Abstract
We build an agent-based model populated by households with heterogenous and time-
varying ﬁnancial conditions in order to study how diﬀerent inequality shocks aﬀect 
income dynamics and the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of ﬁscal policy responses. We show 
that inequality shocks generate persistent falls in aggregate income by increasing the 
fraction of credit-constrained households and by lowering aggregate consumption. 
Furthermore, we experiment with diﬀerent types of ﬁscal policies to counter the eﬀects 
of inequality-generated recessions, namely deﬁcit-spending direct government 
consumption and redistributive subsidies ﬁnanced by diﬀerent types of taxes. We ﬁnd 
that subsidies are in general associated with higher ﬁscal multipliers than direct 
government expenditure, as they appear to be better suited to sustain consumption of 
lower income households after the shock. In addition, we show that the eﬀectiveness of 
redistributive subsidies increases if they are ﬁnanced by taxing ﬁnancial incomes or 
savings.
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1 Introduction
This work investigates how income inequality affects aggregate output in presence of
financial market imperfections, and, relatedly, which type of fiscal policy is better suited
to cope with increases in income inequality.
Two major trends have accompanied the eruption of the Great Recession in 2008:
(i) a spectacular long-term increase in both income and wealth inequality (see Piketty,
2014), (ii) a surge in the fraction of debt-leveraged agents in the economy (see Mian
and Sufi, 2015). The possible causal link between inequality and crises is still highly
debated in the empirical literature (see Atkinson and Morelli, 2011; Bordo and Meissner,
2012). Nevertheless, some recent studies have stressed the presence of an empirical relation
between inequality and the debt dynamics of households (see e.g. Coibion et al., 2014;
Kumhof, Rancie`re, and Winant, 2015). Building on this insight, a number of theoretical
works both in the DSGE (e.g. Iacoviello, 2008; Kumhof, Rancie`re, and Winant, 2015) and
in the agent-based camps (see e.g. Caiani, Russo, and Gallegati, 2016; Cardaci, Saraceno,
et al., 2015; Ciarli et al., 2012; Dosi et al., 2013, 2015, 2016a,b; Isaac, 2014; Russo,
Riccetti, and Gallegati, 2016)1 have proposed models where high inequality can indeed
lead to recessions by producing excessive household leverage of low-income households.
In this work we link the latter strand of literature to the one that has empirically
investigated the state-dependent nature of fiscal multipliers (e.g. Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko, 2012) and the influence of credit regimes on fiscal policy effectiveness (e.g.
Ferraresi, Roventini, and Fagiolo, 2014). We do so by building an agent-based model
where permanent inequality shocks produce large and persistent falls in aggregate output
by generating a high fraction of credit-constrained consumers. Next, we use the model to
study how the effectiveness of different types of fiscal policies (direct government consump-
tion, redistributive policies) changes with the amplitude of the inequality shock hitting
the economy.
More precisely, we extend the agent-based model (ABM henceforth) developed in
Napoletano, Roventini, and Gaffard (2015) to study how time-varying multipliers may
emerge in presence of financial market imperfections and credit rationing. In that work,
we focused on recessions generated by bankruptcy shocks affecting households, and we fo-
cused on the dynamics of fiscal multipliers associated with direct government consumption
under alternative fiscal rules (deficit-spending, balanced-budget). In this work, we turn to
analyze recessions generated by shocks changing the income distribution of agents. In ad-
dition, we consider a broader spectrum of fiscal interventions (direct government spending
vs. redistributive policies), and of possible alternative methods of financing government
subsidies (taxes on financial incomes or on savings). In the model households’ income is
proportional to aggregate income, and income shares vary across households, which, in
1For a survey on macroeconomic agent-based models, see Fagiolo and Roventini (2012, 2017).
turn, are heterogenous in desired levels of consumption. In the model, there are two classes
of households/consumers: savers, who have enough resources to finance their desired con-
sumption plans, and borrowers, who need credit to satisfy their desired consumption
plans. Credit is provided by a bank, which gathers deposits from savers, pays interest
on them and, finally, supplies credit to borrowers. The bank sets the supply of credit
as a multiple of its net-worth and allocates it to borrowers using a pecking-order based
on their financial fragility. As in Napoletano, Roventini, and Gaffard (2015) we identify
a steady state in the model corresponding to a situation of full utilization of resources
and no credit rationing. In that framework we then introduce shocks that permanently
change the inequality in households’ income shares.
Extensive Monte-Carlo simulations show that inequality shocks produce a permanent
fall in output, by generating a large share of borrowers in the population, and a permanent
increase in the fraction of credit-rationed households. Moreover, we find that direct gov-
ernment deficit-spending fiscal policy lowers the fall in income generated by the increase
in inequality, thereby acting as a parachute against shocks.
As in Napoletano, Roventini, and Gaffard (2015), we find that fiscal multipliers as-
sociated with direct government spending are always larger than one. However, the size
of the multiplier decreases with the intensity of the government intervention. The latter
result reflects the fact that, at lower degrees of fiscal intensity, the fall in aggregate income
resulting from a shock is larger (due to the lower “parachute” effect) and this generates a
larger “fiscal space”. Likewise we find that the multipliers associated for a given level of
fiscal intensity decreases with the magnitude of the inequality shock. The latter result is
explained by the fact that a stronger rise in inequality also generates a large redistribu-
tion in favor of the rich households, who save most of their income. In presence of credit
rationing, this increases the leakage in aggregate expenditure, thereby reducing the size
of the multipliers.
Furthermore, we compare the effectiveness of direct government spending vis-a`-vis a
redistributive policy providing subsidies to low-income households. As we assume that
public budget is balances, total expenditures for subsidies are entirely financed by addi-
tional taxes. Our results show that, in general, subsidies are more effective than direct
government spending in dampening the effects of the inequality shocks, and they are as-
sociated with larger fiscal multipliers. This difference is explained by the distributional
consequences of the two fiscal policies. Government consumption affects directly aggre-
gate demand and the benefits of this policy accrues to households in proportion to their
share of aggregate income, and thus in higher proportion to richer households. This, in
turns, generates additional saving and thus increases leakages in aggregate expenditure.
In contrast, subsidies are specifically targeted to low-income households. This generates
additional consumption and injections in aggregate expenditure.
Finally, we also experiment with different ways of financing subsidies, considering
taxes on (i) profits and wage income related to the real economic activity (productive
income henceforth); (ii) financial income (i.e. interests on deposits), (iii) deposit savings.
We find that a redistributive policy financed by either taxes on financial incomes or on
savings is more effective than one financed via taxes on productive income. The reason
of this difference is explained by the fact that the latter type of tax reduces the income
of all households in the economy, and of low income households in particular, thereby
dampening the effects of subsidies. The other two types of taxes, instead, target directly
the sources of leakage in the aggregate expenditure, thereby contributing to increase the
effectiveness of the subsidies policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 presents the simulation results, starting with the effect of inequality shocks, and then
turning to analyze the effectiveness of different types of fiscal policies. Finally, Section 4
concludes.
2 The model
In the model there are N heterogeneous households. Each household i owns a fixed
amount of an homogeneous input good, “wheat”, that cannot be used for consumption and
which is sold in order to gather resources for consumption. The input good is purchased
by j homogeneous firms, the “mills”, that use it to produce an output good, “flour”.
Households consume the homogeneous output good produced by firms.
Firms use a constant returns to scale technology. Firm j’s production function is
Yjt = Ljt (1)
where Ljt is the amount of wheat purchased by the firm. Total output is simply
Yt = Lt (2)
The price at which the wheat is purchased is Pl. The firms gets zero profits out of the
consumable good production so that P0 = Pl. Finally, in this model overall consumption
demand determines the level of mills’ output up to the maximum level of available wheat
Lmax.
Each household has a constant desired level of consumption Zi such that if Zi ≤ Wit,
where Wit is households’ i liquid wealth at time t, the household is a saver and her
consumption equal to her desired level. Otherwise, if Zi > Wit, household i is a borrower.
Savers can always finance their consumption with their own liquid wealth. Accordingly,
consumption of this class of agents is always equal to their desired level. In contrast,
borrowers need credit to satisfy their consumption plans. Later on we insert the possibility
of credit rationing: borrowers who do not get credit will not be able to satisfy their
desired consumption plans, and they will be forced to rely only on their liquid wealth for
consumption.
In the economy there is a representative bank whose total credit supply is a multiple
of the net worth of the bank EBt (Delli Gatti et al., 2005)
TSt = kE
B
t (3)
where k > 0 is the credit multiplier and, since we are in an endogenous money framework
(Lavoie, 2003), k > 1. Credit supply depends on the bank’s net worth at time t, EBt , such
that the healthier is the bank from a financial viewpoint, the higher is the credit supply
in the economy. Credit is allocated to agents using a pecking order (Dosi et al., 2013,
2015) depending on the ratio between a household’s wealth and credit demand, Wit/CDit.
Credit demand is given by CDit = Zit −Wit. If total credit demand is higher than total
credit supply some borrowers are partially or totally credit rationed. In the case credit
is denied to some agents, their consumption is equal to their current net liquid wealth,
Wit.
The bank sets the interest rate on loans by applying a mark-up µ on the baseline
interest rate r set by the central bank ( 0 < µb < 1 ). Likewise, the interest rate paid
on deposits, rs is determined by applying a mark-down µs on the baseline interest rate
(0 < µs < 1). Therefore, interest rates on loans and deposits are respectively
rb = r(1 + µb) (4)
rs = r(1− µs) (5)
Bank liabilities, LBt , are defined as the difference between the assets of the bank (the
credit supply) and its net worth:
LBt = kE
B
t − EBt = (k − 1)EBt (6)
Bank profits piBt are given by:
piBt = r
b
t (kE
B
t )− rs(k − 1)EBt = [rs + k(rb − rs)]EBt (7)
If some households go bankrupt, their bad debt, BDit, negatively affects the bank’s
net worth and, thus, credit supply. Finally, we assume that there is a target level of net
worth E¯Bt such that if E
B
t ≥ E¯Bt bank profits are distributed to a homogeneous class of
agents, the bankers, who entirely consume their income. If instead EBt < E¯
B
t then the
bank does not distribute the profits, which are instead added to the bank’s reserves. The
law of motion for the bank’s net-worth thus reads:
EBt =
{
EBt−1 − ΣNi=1BDit, if EBt ≥ E¯Bt
EBt−1 + pi
B
t − ΣNi=1BDit, if EBt < E¯Bt
(8)
Concerning fiscal policy, there is a proportional tax on income, such that households’
disposable income is given by:
yDit = (1− τ)yit (9)
with i = 1, ..., N and τ > 0 being the tax rate.
The government sets its consumption level and the tax rate according to a deficit-
spending fiscal rule. This means that the government keeps the level of government
spending at the steady state level and deficit emerges whenever tax revenues fall below
the steady state level. Government debt (if any) is purchased by the central bank.
Aggregate demand is given by
Yt = ADt = Ct +Gt + pi
B
t (10)
such that it is defined as the sum of households and government consumption, respec-
tively Ct and Gt, plus the consumption of bankers, pi
B
t , if any. As long as the constraint
Lmax is not binding aggregate income is determined by aggregate demand.
Total households income Y Ht is total income minus the income of bankers, i.e. Y
H
t =
Yt − piBt .
2.1 The balance sheet dynamics of households
Let us define βit = Zi/Wit as household’s i marginal propensity to consume out of wealth
at time t. In particular, βit > 1 if the household is a borrower, while βit ≤ 1 if the
household is a saver.
It is assumed that consumption loans are fully repaid at the end of each period. The
same occurs for the remuneration of savings.
The law of motion of agents’ wealth is thus
Wit+1 = (1− τ)yt − (1 + rb)(βit − 1)Wit (11)
if the agent is a borrower, and
Wit+1 = (1− τ)yt + (1 + rs)(1− βit)Wit (12)
if the agent is a saver.
Households go bankrupt if they are unable to repay their debt. This occurs if house-
hold’s resources at the beginning of the period are lower than debt plus interests, so
if:
(1− τ)yit < (1 + rb)(βit − 1)Wit (13)
In terms of consumption levels:
(1− τ)yit < (1 + rb)(Cit −Wit) (14)
If a households goes bankrupt, his wealth is set equal to zero and the bank gets a
credit loss equal to:
BDit = (1 + rb)(Cit −Wit)− (1− τ)yit (15)
Bankrupted households are denied access to the credit market for Tdefault periods.
Moreover, in some scenarios we consider later on, savers may face either a flat tax on
financial income, φ, or a flat tax on deposits, η after an inequality shock is introduced.
In the first case, savers’ wealth is updated in the following way:
Wit+1 = (1− τ)yt + [1 + (1− φ)rs] (1− βit)Wit (16)
When, instead, a tax on deposits is applied, savers’ wealth evolves according to:
Wit+1 = (1− τ)yt + (1 + rs)(1− η)(1− βit)Wit (17)
Furthermore, in some scenarios the government distributes a subsidy to low-income house-
holds after the inequality shock. This subsidy is directly added to the income of the
household who receives it, and it is financed either by the proportional tax on income, or
by the tax on financial income or, finally, by the tax on deposits.
2.2 The timeline of events
In each time period the sequence of events is the following:
• Desired consumption and the ensuing households credit demand are determined
• Government consumption and the government balance are fixed
• The bank sets the credit supply, which is allocated to consumers
• Actual private consumption is determined
• Aggregate income of the period is computed and distributed to agents
• Taxes are collected
• Households repay their debt, compute their wealth, and bankruptcies occur
2.3 Steady state conditions
At the beginning of each simulation run the economy is in steady state. In steady state,
the levels of all micro (households wealth, households income, households consumption,
debt, profits of the bank) and macro (aggregate consumption, government expenditure,
income, tax revenues) variables are constant. Moreover, in steady state, credit rationing
is absent and all resources are fully utilized. Notice that steady states are not unique in
the model. In particular, in Section 3 we show that the model has multiple steady states,
also characterized by a positive share of credit rationed consumers.
Each household is assigned a time-invariant share of total household income. Dispos-
able income of each household i at time t can be therefore written as:
yit = αi(1− τ)Y Ht (18)
where Y Ht is total household income.
The steady-state level of wealth, considering that in absence of credit-rationing all
borrowers are able to satisfy their consumption plans, is
w∗i =
αi(1− τ)Y H∗t
[1− (1 + rb)(1− β∗i )]
(19)
if the agent is a borrower, and
w∗i =
αi(1− τ)Y H∗t
[1− (1 + rs)(1− β∗i )]
(20)
if the agent is a saver. The above steady state levels are stable if |(1 + rb)(1−β∗i ) < 1|
for a borrower and if |(1 + rs)(1− β∗i ) < 1| for a saver.
Aggregate consumption is constant in steady state and each agent consumes a fraction
of total consumption: equal to:
C∗i = γ
∗
iC
∗
i (21)
where ΣNi γ
∗
i = 1.
Furthermore, as C∗i = β
∗
i w
∗
i and C
∗ = (1− τ)Y H∗,
β∗i αi
[1− (1 + rb)(1− β∗i )]
= γ∗i (22)
for a borrower;
β∗i αi
[1− (1 + rs)(1− β∗i )]
= γ∗i (23)
for a saver.
Finally, we can write agents’ marginal propensity to consume in steady state for bor-
rowers and savers respectively as
β∗i =
γ∗i r
b
[γ∗i rb + (γ
∗
i − αi)]
(24)
β∗i =
γ∗i r
s
[γ∗i rs + (γ
∗
i − αi)]
(25)
For a given distribution of income shares, consumption weights are randomly assigned
to households and values of β∗i are computed, so that the fraction of borrowers in the
population is 0 < η∗ < 1.
3 Simulation results
In this analysis, each simulation experiment includes 50 independent Monte-Carlo simula-
tions 2. In each Monte-Carlo repetition, we run simulations for a series of 6 fiscal intensity
parameters, which define government expenditures as percentages of steady state income.
The same parameters also determine the proportional tax rate.
In addition to a proportional tax on income, households face either a tax on financial
income or a tax on deposits.
Moreover, we consider two different scenarios for government expenditure. In the first
one government consumption directly enters in aggregate income, using a deficit-spending
fiscal rule. The government keeps the level of government spending at the steady state
level and deficit emerges whenever tax revenues fall below the steady state level. In the
second scenario, a subsidy is introduced after the inequality shock. The subsidy is targeted
towards low-income households. This is a balanced-budget policy: total expenditure for
subsidies is equal to the taxes collected by the government in the previous period.
In the initial steady state, income is assigned to households by using an algorithm
generating shares that are comprehended within a small range of values3. This implies
that the initial income distribution is quite egalitarian. Next, at time t = 3 the economy is
shocked such that the distribution of income shares becomes considerably more unequal,
2As pointed out by Fagiolo and Roventini (2012, 2017), this method permits to have a distribution of a
given statistics computed on simulated variables. In fact, given the stochastic nature of the process, each
Monte-Carlo run will give a different value of such statistics. By analyzing how this statistics depends
on some initial parameters, one can get descriptive knowledge of the dynamics in the system.
3See Napoletano, Roventini, and Gaffard (2015) for more details about the algorithm generating
income shares
and we then track the dynamics of the economy resulting from the above shock. The
analysis is performed for different magnitudes of the inequality shock that map different
fractions of the income earned by the lower and middle classes. Three different inequality
shocks are considered: a “low inequality shock”, in which 98% of the population get 80%
of total income, a “medium inequality shock”, which is the one analyzed in detail in the
subsequent section, in which the bottom 98% of the population get 60% of total income,
and a “high inequality shock”, in which the bottom 97% of the population get 40% of
total income. Finally, we repeat the above described experiments with inequality shocks
for the following policy scenarios:
• direct government expenditure, proportional tax on income and flat tax on financial
income (Scenario I);
• direct government expenditure, proportional tax on income and flat tax on deposits
(Scenario II);
• subsidy and proportional tax on income (Scenario III);
• subsidy and flat tax on financial income (Scenario IV);
• subsidy and flat tax on deposits (Scenario V).
3.1 Scenarios I and II: Medium inequality shock
Let us begin by discussing the case of a medium inequality shock introduced in the sce-
narios where government consumption enters directly in aggregate income (scenarios I
and II). In both scenarios, aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income falls
considerably after the inequality shock is introduced. This is revealed by Figure 1. When
the distribution becomes more unequal, many households lack the internal resources nec-
essary to finance desired consumption and there is a decline in aggregate demand that
spurs a trend of plunging aggregate income, with the economy entering a recession, in
line with Dosi et al. (2013, 2015) and Cardaci, Saraceno, et al. (2015).
The figure also shows the evolution of aggregate income over time for different fis-
cal intensity parameters, which set the level of (constant) government expenditure as a
fraction of steady state income. First, the smaller is the fiscal intensity, the deeper is
the downturn, suggesting that a more active government dampens the negative effects
triggered by the switch to a regime of highly skewed income distribution.
Furthermore, Figure 1 also reveals that - for any fiscal intensity - the shock has perma-
nent effect on aggregate income, which converges to a lower steady-state level. This is true
for every fiscal intensity parameter considered. Let us turn to analyze the behavior of fis-
cal multipliers in the direct government expenditure scenarios. Multipliers are calculated
as a ratio between the variation in aggregate output in two scenarios with different fiscal
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Figure 1: Evolution of aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income. Each point
on the graph is an average of 50 independent Monte-Carlo simulations.
intensities and the variation in government consumption in these two different cases. The
baseline level of fiscal intensity z is the one in which government consumption corresponds
to 1% of steady state income.
mfrh (t) =
Y frh (t)− Y frz (t)
Gfrh (t)−Gfrz (t)
with h 6= z (26)
The dynamics of fiscal multipliers is plotted in Figure 2. The figure shows that fiscal
multipliers are state-dependent and time-varying. In addition, they are higher for lower
levels of aggregate income. When aggregate income reaches extremely low levels after the
inequality shock, active government expenditures can provide a stimulus to the economy
and may, thus, have a stronger impact on the evolution of aggregate income. In other
words, there is a bigger “fiscal space” in the cases where the crisis is more evident. Fur-
thermore, Figure 2 reveals that - for all levels of fiscal intensity - peak multipliers are
significantly higher than one. This is in line with Auerbach and Gorodnichenko’s (2012)
empirical findings about the high levels of multipliers during recessions.
To shed light on the drivers of high fiscal multipliers in the model, let us analyze the
evolution of the fraction of constrained borrowers after the shock (cf. Figure 3). The
share of credit-constrained borrowers rises after the inequality shock and stays perma-
nently high. The introduction of an inequality shock leads to a situation in which many
households find themselves with a lower income share than in steady state, such that
their desired level of consumption, which is assumed to be constant over time, can now
be higher than the resources at their disposal. In other words, following the inequality
shock households’ realized marginal propensities to consume become very high for agents
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Figure 2: Evolution of fiscal multipliers with respect to 0.01 fiscal impulse. Each point
on the graph is an average of 50 independent Monte-Carlo simulations.
who cannot satisfy their consumption plans. These households are the ones who after
the shock get a lower income share than in steady state 4. This implies that a larger
number of households has to take up debt in order to finance the same level of desired
consumption. The pool of borrowers thus widens. In such a situation, credit supply is
not sufficient to cover all credit demand, and credit rationing arises (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981), and leads to a fall in aggregate consumption and in aggregate income. These above
dynamics are in line with recent empirical findings (e.g. Ferraresi, Roventini, and Fagiolo,
2014), that suggest the fact that fiscal policy is more effective in tighter credit regimes.
Again, government consumption can dampen the perverse dynamics triggered by a rise in
inequality, and this is why we observe a lower fraction of constrained borrowers for higher
fiscal intensity parameters.
3.2 Scenarios I and II: Comparison among different inequality
shocks
The results of the previous section concern only the case of a medium inequality shock.
In this section we move to compare the dynamics of the economy under alternative sizes
of the shock.
Table 1 reports the minimum level of aggregate income (as a fraction of steady state
income) that is obtained for different inequality shocks and different fiscal intensities.
4This is in line with the work of Caiani, Russo, and Gallegati (2016).
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Figure 3: Evolution of the average fraction of constrained borrowers. Each point on the
graph is an average of 50 independent Monte-Carlo simulations.
Notice that the lower such a level of income is, the more severe are the consequences of a
given shock. First, the results in the table indicate that more inequality generates larger
falls in aggregate income. At any fiscal intensity, minimum income is lower in the case of
the high inequality shock. Second, for any inequality shock the fall in income is lower if
the level of fiscal intensity is higher. This confirms that government spending acts as a
parachute against the fall in household incomes for whatever shape of the distribution of
income.
Fiscal intensity Low inequality Medium inequality High inequality
5% 18% 13% 11%
10% 27% 21% 18%
15% 34% 28% 25%
50% 68% 65% 61%
Table 1: Minimum aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income for low, medium
and high inequality
These dynamics can be explained by looking at the average fraction of constrained
borrowers in the different inequality scenarios. Figure 4 compares the dynamics of the
share of credit constrained borrowers across the low and high inequality shock, and it
clearly reveals that the average fraction of constrained borrowers is higher in the case in
which the level of inequality becomes higher.
Finally, Table 2 compares the evolution of multipliers for different inequality scenarios.
The results in the table indicate that a less skewed distribution of income is associated
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Figure 4: Average fraction of constrained households for 15% fiscal intensity parameter,
low inequality vs. high inequality
with higher multipliers. This may at first glance sound counter-intuitive because higher
inequality is associated with higher aggregate income falls, and thus one would expect a
larger fiscal space as well. However, it becomes more clear if one thinks more carefully
about the distributional consequences of inequality shocks. A stronger inequality shock
generates a larger distribution of income in favor of the rich, who save most of their in-
come. In presence of credit rationing, this increases the leakage in aggregate expenditure
and the multiplier is therefore reduced. This sheer effect of the rise of inequality is fur-
ther reinforced by the fact that, when government consumption affects directly aggregate
demand, the benefits of fiscal policy accrue to households in proportion to their share of
aggregate income, and thus in higher proportion to rich households, who save instead of
generating additional expenditure.5
Fiscal intensity Low inequality Medium inequality High inequality
5% 2.36 1.97 1.51
10% 2.02 1.80 1.46
15% 1.81 1.67 1.39
50% 1.21 1.21 1.14
Table 2: Peak multipliers with respect to 1% fiscal intensity.
3.3 Redistributive fiscal policies
This section analyzes the effects of the introduction of redistributive policies in the econ-
omy. We first analyze the case where the subsidy is financed by a proportional tax on
5Notice however that, in a genuine Keynesian fashion, aggregate saving falls with aggregate income
following the inequality shock.
income (Scenario III). Next, we turn to study the cases where the subsidy is financed by
a tax on financial income (Scenario IV) and, finally, by a tax on deposits (Scenario V).
3.3.1 Scenario III
Let us focus again on the scenario with medium inequality shock. The introduction
of a subsidy financed by a proportional tax on income, implies a less severe downturn
compared to the case of direct government spending (compare Figures 5 and 1). This
confirms empirical findings about positive effects of redistribution on the evolution of
output (e.g. Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides, 2014) and theoretical findings that posit that
the introduction of subsidies stabilizes macroeconomic dynamics (e.g. Caiani, Russo, and
Gallegati, 2016; Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini, 2010; Dosi et al., 2013). Consider for
instance the case where the fiscal intensity parameter is equal to 15%. What emerges from
Table 3 is that the minimum aggregate income, measured as a fraction of steady state
income, is of 34%, compared to a minimum income of 28% in a scenario without subsidy.
In fact, when a subsidy is introduced after the inequality shock, poorer households are
able to increase more their consumption, thereby contributing to dampen the adverse
effects of the rise of inequality and to increase the resilience of the economy.
The effects of the introduction of a subsidy widely differ depending on the fiscal inten-
sity parameter. In fact, as emerges from Figure 5, for the highest value of the parameter,
the fall in aggregate income is quite limited and, after some periods, the subsidy allows
the economy to attain a level of aggregate income which is close to the initial one, given by
the more egalitarian distribution of income. This is because the government has a higher
amount of resources at its disposal to be used for redistributive purposes. Therefore, in
this scenario with 50% fiscal intensity, a high government expenditure in the first periods
reduces the fall in aggregate output, and, combined with the introduction of the subsidy
after the inequality shock, it allows the economy to quickly recover from the crisis, almost
fully. However, for all fiscal intensity parameters, the economy reaches a steady state
which is lower than the initial one.
Fiscal intensity Direct government expenditure With subsidy
5% 13% 14%
10% 21% 24%
15% 28% 34%
Table 3: Minimum aggregate income as a fraction of SS income, medium inequality shock.
Direct government expenditure vs. subsidy.
Comparing multipliers for the cases with subsidy and with direct public expenditure,
it turns out that peak multipliers are higher in the former case. Taking again as example
the case with a fiscal intensity of 15 percent, Table 4 shows that the value of the multiplier
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Figure 5: Evolution of aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income. Scenario
III, medium inequality shock.
Fiscal intensity Direct government expenditure With subsidy
5% 1.97 2.19
10% 1.80 2.23
15% 1.67 2.08
Table 4: Peak multipliers with respect to 0.01 fiscal impulse. Medium inequality. Direct
government expenditure vs. subsidy.
is equal to 2.08 with subsidy, while it is equal to 1.67 in the scenario without this redis-
tributive policy. In other words, the subsidy has a bigger effect on aggregate income than
direct public expenditure. This is because the subsidy increases directly poor households’
disposable income. This dampens the increase in leakage resulting from the inequality
shock (see previous section), thus generating a higher multiplier compared to the case of
direct government expenditure.
Summing up, the introduction of a redistributive policy, such as a subsidy, not only
attenuates the fall in aggregate income due to an inequality shock, by functioning as an
automatic stabilizer. It also triggers larger variation in incomes than direct government
consumption. The higher effectiveness of redistributive fiscal policies is also evident across
different inequality shocks. Table 5 shows the effects of introducing the subsidy in different
inequality scenarios. What emerges is that the subsidy limits the fall in aggregate income
for each of the three scenarios and for each fiscal intensity parameter (compare Table 5
to Table 1).
Finally, Figure 6 tracks the evolution of fiscal multipliers associated with the introduc-
Inequality shock Direct government expenditure With subsidy
Low 34% 43%
Medium 29% 34%
High 25% 29%
Table 5: Minimum aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income for low, medium
and high inequality. Direct government expenditure vs. subsidy. 15 percent fiscal inten-
sity.
tion of a subsidy, respectively for the low and high inequality shocks. Similarly to the case
of direct government spending, fiscal multipliers are higher when inequality is lower. This
is again explained by the dynamics of the model, that implies a higher leakage associated
with stronger inequality shocks (see discussion in the previous section). Nevertheless, for
any magnitude of the inequality shock, the subsidy allows a higher fiscal multiplier effect
than direct. This is revealed by Table 6, that compares peak multipliers for the different
policy scenarios considered so far (and for a fiscal intensity of 15%). Let us now turn to
analyze whether the effects of redistributive policies are affected by the way the subsidy
is financed.
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Figure 6: Evolution of fiscal multipliers for 0.15 fiscal intensity with respect to 0.01 fiscal
impulse in the scenario with subsidy. Low and high inequality shock.
Inequality shock Direct government expenditure With subsidy
Low inequality 1.88 2.24
Medium inequality 1.63 2.12
High inequality 1.39 1.74
Table 6: Maximum multiplier for 0.15 fiscal intensity parameter with respect to 0.01 fiscal
impulse. Direct government expenditure vs. subsidy (Scenario III).
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Figure 7: Evolution of average fraction of constrained borrowers in the scenario with
subsidy, low and high inequality shock. 15% fiscal intensity parameter.
3.3.2 Scenario IV
Consider first the case in which the subsidy is financed with a tax on financial income
instead of a flat tax on income. Our simulations show that the magnitude of the fall
in aggregate income is basically the same as in the previous case. What significantly
changes is the dynamics after the crisis. In fact, for any fiscal intensity parameters,
aggregate income does not get stuck at a lower level of income, but it returns to the
initial steady state level.
Furthermore, and in line with previous results, a high fiscal intensity parameter limits
the fall in aggregate income. When the subsidy is introduced after the crisis, aggregate
income increases faster in cases where the fall is less severe. The dynamics underlying
the initial fall in aggregate income and the subsequent increase are analogous to the ones
presented in previous sections. Scenario IV, by taxing financial income, allows a higher
degree of redistribution in the population. This allows households to repair their balance
sheets throughout the time span considered, and gradually increase their consumption.
A comparison of the different inequality cases shows that the fall in aggregate income
is more pronounced for higher levels of inequality, as visible from Table 7. Moreover, the
subsequent recovery is faster when inequality is low. In fact, low inequality is associated
with a lower fraction of constrained borrowers in the population, as shown in Figure 9.
This means that when inequality is high a higher fraction of households are not able to
satisfy consumption plans. In this case, the recovery is slower.
Let us now analyze fiscal multipliers and compare their evolution in the low and
high inequality cases. At the beginning, for several periods, these are higher when the
system is characterized by a low concentration of income, as shown in Figure 10. By
increasing income levels, subsidies allow borrowers to repair their balance sheets. However,
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Figure 8: Evolution of aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income. Scenario
IV, medium inequality shock.
Inequality shock Max multiplier Minimum aggregate income
Low inequality 3.87 44%
Medium inequality 4.28 37%
High inequality 4.53 30%
Table 7: Peak multipliers and minimum aggregate income in Scenario IV for different
inequality shocks. 15% fiscal intensity.
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Figure 9: Evolution of average fraction of constrained borrowers. Low vs. high inequality
shock. Scenario IV, 15% fiscal intensity.
in Scenario IV it takes time for indebted or credit constrained households to get back to
desired consumption levels. This process explains why in a 100 periods time span the
highest peak multipliers are observed in the low inequality scenario. In fact, for the
high inequality case, it takes even more time than in the low inequality case. In a wider
time span, from Figure 10 we observe that, when the steady state level is reached again,
the highest level of peak multipliers over 500 periods is observed in the high inequality
scenario. This is because there is a wider fiscal space in this case 6.
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Figure 10: Evolution of fiscal multipliers. Scenario IV, 15% fiscal intensity. Low vs. high
inequality shock.
3.3.3 Scenario V
Let us now consider the case in which subsidies are financed with a tax on savers’ deposits.
This time, the return to steady state is much faster with respect to the previous case,
as visible from Figure 11. The higher is the initial fiscal intensity parameter, the less
pronounced is the fall in aggregate income and the faster is the process of recovery.
Similarly to Scenario IV, the combination of subsidies given to low-income households
and a tax on deposits grants a high degree of redistribution across households. In this
scenario, the positive effects of such a redistribution are even more visible.
The different inequality scenarios differ in the magnitude of the fall (Table 8) and,
thus, in the speed of recovery.
In fact, higher inequality is associated with a higher fraction of constrained borrowers
in the population, as shown in Figure 12. As subsidies are distributed to households,
their income increases, such that they can increase consumption. As the average frac-
6In scenario III, aggregate income persistently stayed at lower levels in the high inequality case with
respect to the low inequality case. Lower peak multipliers were associated with high inequality. In
fact, when resources used for redistributive aims are not sufficient to significantly change low-income
households’ situation, a more skewed distribution seems to act as an impediment for the recovery.
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Figure 11: Evolution of aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income. Scenario
V, medium inequality shock.
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Figure 12: Evolution of average fraction of constrained borrowers. Scenario V, 15% fiscal
intensity. Low vs. high inequality shock.
tion of constrained borrowers decreases, income increases, fostering a positive spiral of
diminishing fraction of constrained borrowers and increasing income through increased
consumption. When the average fraction of constrained borrowers approaches zero, the
economy is back to the initial steady state.
Peak multipliers are decreasing with the value of fiscal intensity parameters, as shown
in Table 9. Moreover, peak multipliers are higher for higher levels of inequality (Table
8). With the economy getting back to steady state in all inequality scenarios, a more
concentrated income distribution is associated with a more pronounced fall in aggregate
income and, thus, with a wider fiscal space. Finally, Table 9 makes a comparison among
the different scenarios with subsidy, for what concerns fiscal multipliers. The highest
multipliers are associated to the ones observed in Scenario IV, as it takes more time for
aggregate income to return to steady state. This implies a larger fiscal space.
Inequality shock Max multiplier Minimum aggregate income
Low inequality 3.2 44%
Medium inequality 3.44 36%
High inequality 3.68 30%
Table 8: Peak multipliers and minimum aggregate income for different inequality shocks.
Scenario V. 15% fiscal intensity.
Fiscal intensity Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V
5% 2.19 8.30 7.54
10% 2.23 5.58 4.67
15% 2.08 4.28 3.44
Table 9: Comparison among peak multipliers in scenarios with subsidy. Medium inequal-
ity shock. 15% fiscal intensity.
4 Conclusions
We built a simple agent-based model to study the impact of inequality shocks on income
dynamics in presence of financial imperfection and to analyze the effectiveness of different
types of fiscal policies.
We find that permanent inequality shocks produce large and persistent falls in output
by generating large pools of credit-constrained consumers. Simulation results show that
fiscal policy always dampens the effects of the inequality shock on aggregate output and
the emerging fiscal multipliers are larger than one. At the same time, redistributive
fiscal policy providing subsidies to low-income households is more effective than direct
government spending. This is explained by the different distributional effects associated
with such policies. Direct government spending has a regressive impact, as it benefits
more households with larger income shares. In contrast, redistributive subsidies directly
benefit low income households, generating larger injections in aggregate expenditure and
higher fiscal multipliers. We also find that the financing of subsidies also matters: fiscal
transfers to low income households are more effective if they are financed via taxes on
financial income and savings instead of productive income ones. This is because taxes
on financial income and savings reduce the leakage in aggregate expenditures, thereby
boosting the positive impact of fiscal policy on income.
Our model could be extended in several ways. First, one could study policies that
affect the balance sheet of the bank and its propensity to provide credit to households
(e.g. unconventional monetary policies). Likewise, we have only considered exogenous
changes to income inequality. One could instead extend the model in order to account
for endogenous and time evolving-inequality, and then study how different types of fiscal
and monetary policies can affect the latter.
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